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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The American law of freedom of religion is in trouble, because growing 
numbers of critics, including a near-majority of the Supreme Court, are 
ready to cast aside the ideal of religious neutrality.  My book, Defending 
American Religious Neutrality,1 defends the claim, which unfortunately has 
become an audacious one, that American religious neutrality is coherent and 
attractive.  Here I will briefly describe its claims. 
Two factions dominate contemporary discussion of these issues in 
American law.  One, whom I will call the radical secularists, tend to regard 
the law of the Religion Clauses as a flawed attempt to achieve neutrality 
across all controversial conceptions of the good—flawed because it is 
satisfied with something less than the complete eradication of religion from 
public life.  The other, whom I will call the religious traditionalists, think 
that any claim of neutrality is a fraud, and that law necessarily involves 
some substantive commitments.  They claim that there is nothing wrong 
with frank state endorsement of religious propositions: if the state is 
inevitably going to take sides, why not this one?  One side regards religion 
 *  John Paul Stevens Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, Northwestern 
University.  Copyright 2013, Harvard University Press.  This Article is a part of Pepperdine 
University School of Law’s February 2012 conference entitled, The Competing Claims of Law and 
Religion: Who Should Influence Whom? 
 1.  ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY (forthcoming Jan. 
2013).  The present article is adapted from the introduction to this book. 
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as toxic and valueless; the other is untroubled by the state’s embrace of an 
official religion.  Neither sees much value in the way American law actually 
functions. 
Yet America has been unusually successful in dealing with religious 
diversity.  The civil peace that the United States has almost effortlessly 
achieved has been beyond the capacities of many other generally well-
functioning democracies, such as France, Germany, and Italy.  Even if the 
American law of religious liberty were entirely incoherent, it might still be 
an attractive approach to this perennial human problem.  There is, however, 
a deep logic to the law that its critics have not understood. 
Prominent scholars of religion ridiculed President-elect Dwight 
Eisenhower’s 1952 declaration: “Our [form of] government has no sense 
unless it is founded in a deeply felt religious faith—and I don’t care what it 
is.”2  Eisenhower nonetheless revealed a deep insight into the character of 
American neutrality. 
Contrary to the radical secularists, First Amendment doctrine treats 
religion as a good thing.  It insists, however—and here it parts company with 
the religious traditionalists—that religion’s goodness be understood at a high 
enough level of abstraction that the state takes no position on any live 
religious dispute.  It holds that religion’s value is best honored by 
prohibiting the state from trying to answer religious questions. 
American religious neutrality has over time become more vague as 
America has become more religiously diverse, so that today (with the 
exception of a few grandfathered practices) the state may not even affirm the 
existence of God.  This kind of neutrality is not the kind of neutrality toward 
all conceptions of the good that many liberal political theorists have 
advocated, but it is the best response to the enormous variety of religious 
views in modern America.  It is faithful to the belief, held by the leading 
framers of the First Amendment, that religion can be corrupted by state 
support.3 
Many aspects of present American law in this area are puzzling.  Some 
kinds of official religion are clearly impermissible, such as official prayers 
and Bible reading in public schools.4  Laws such as a ban on the teaching of 
evolution are struck down because they lack a secular purpose.5  Yet at the 
same time, “In God We Trust” appears on the currency,6 legislative sessions 
 2.  Both the statement and the ridicule are noted in Patrick Henry, “And I Don’t Care What It 
Is”: The Tradition-History of a Civil Religion Proof-Text, 49 J. AM. ACAD. RELIGION. 35, 36 (1981).  
Eisenhower’s critics include Will Herberg and Robert Bellah.  See id. at 38, 42, 44. 
 3.  See Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1831 (2009).  This concern goes unmentioned in the opinions of Justices Scalia and 
Thomas, who claim to be originalists.  See Andrew Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the 
Establishment Clause, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 727 (2009). 
   4.  See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
   5.  See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
   6.  History of ‘In God We Trust,’ U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Mar. 8, 2011, 9:43 AM), 
http://www.treasury.gov/about/education/Pages/in-god-we-trust.aspx. 
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begin with prayers,7 judicial proceedings begin with “God save the United 
States and this Honorable Court,”8 Christmas is an official holiday,9 and, of 
course, the words “under God” appear in the Pledge of Allegiance.  Old 
manifestations of official religion are tolerated, while new ones are enjoined 
by the courts: the Supreme Court held in 2005 that an official Ten 
Commandments display is unconstitutional if it was erected recently, but not 
if it has been around for decades.10  There is confusion about faith-based 
social services, public financing of religious schools, and the teaching of 
“intelligent design.” 
All this, I will argue, makes sense.  The key is understanding the precise 
level of abstraction at which American law is neutral toward religion. 
II.  THE CHARACTER OF AMERICAN NEUTRALITY 
Religious liberty in American law has for decades been understood in 
the language of neutrality.  The decision barring official Bible readings in 
the public schools is only the most prominent example.11  Neutrality is a 
ubiquitous theme in Establishment Clause decisions spanning more than half 
a century.12  One prominent scholar has concluded that neutrality is 
“[p]erhaps the most pervasive theme in modern judicial and academic 
discourse on the subject of religious freedom.”13  For a brief period in the 
1970s and early 1980s it appeared that the idea of neutrality would be a 
master concept of both the constitutional law of religion and liberal political 
philosophy more generally. 
Its reign was short, however.  It quickly came under attack on two 
grounds.  First was the charge of incoherence: political theorists objected 
that any government must necessarily rely upon and promote some 
   7.  See, e.g., Opening Prayer, OFFICE OF THE CHAPLAIN: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
http://chaplain.house.gov/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2012). 
 8.  The Court and Its Procedures, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
about/procedures.aspx (last visited Mar. 12, 2012). 
 9.  2012 Federal Holidays, U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., http://www.opm.gov/operating_ 
status_schedules/fedhol/2012.asp (last visited Mar. 12, 2012). 
 10.  McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 868–71 (2005). 
 11.  See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 218, 222, 225, 226 (1963). 
 12.  See, e.g., McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 860, 874–81; Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of 
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839–46 (1995); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985); Walz v. Tax 
Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952); Everson v. Bd. of 
Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). 
 13. STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE 
OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 77 (1995) [hereinafter SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE]; see Andrew 
Koppelman, The Fluidity of Neutrality, 66 REV. POL. 633, 635–36 (2004) [hereinafter Koppelman, 
Fluidity]. 
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contestable scheme of values, so neutrality is impossible.14  The charge of 
incoherence was also raised against the idea of neutrality in the Supreme 
Court’s religion jurisprudence.  This objection focused on a deep tension in 
the Court’s position, between the idea that religion ought to be 
accommodated, and the idea that government should be neutral between 
religion and nonreligion.15 
The idea of neutrality was also blamed for substantively bad results.  A 
neutral state would be disabled from pursuing real goods, and so its citizens’ 
lives would not be as good as they could be.16  Moreover, the requirement of 
state neutrality was deemed hostile toward religion, producing a “naked 
public square” in which the public is deprived of urgently needed moral 
resources.17 
Today, the constitutional law of religion is in disarray, because a 
growing number of legal scholars and Supreme Court Justices are impressed 
by these claims.  Steven D. Smith concludes that the quest for a neutral 
theory of religious freedom “is an attempt to grasp an illusion.”18  Thomas 
Hurka declares that in political theory, “it is hard not to believe that the 
period of neutralist liberalism is now over.”19 
These criticisms grow out of a larger consensus that the American law 
of religious liberty makes no sense.  It has been called “unprincipled, 
incoherent, and unworkable,”20 “a disaster,”21 “in serious disarray,”22 
“chaotic, controversial and unpredictable,”23 “in shambles,”24 “schizoid,”25 
and “a complete hash.”26 
 14.  See, e.g., WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN 
THE LIBERAL STATE 92–94 (1991); SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 13, at 77–97. 
 15.  See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 616–18 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Michael W. 
McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 131 (1992). 
 16.  GEORGE SHER, BEYOND NEUTRALITY: PERFECTIONISM AND POLITICS (1997). 
 17.  RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE (2d ed. 1986). 
 18.  SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 13, at 96. 
 19.  Thomas Hurka, Book Review, George Sher’s Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics, 
109 ETHICS 187, 190 (1998). 
 20.  Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 477, 478 
(1991); see also MARK V. TUSHNET, RED WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 247 (1998) (“incoherent”). 
 21.  Vincent Phillip Muñoz, Establishing Free Exercise, FIRST THINGS, DEC. 2003, at 14 (“If 
conservative and liberal church-state scholars agree on one thing, it is that the Supreme Court’s 
religious liberty jurisprudence is a disaster.”). 
 22.  Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 
U. PA. L. REV. 149, 149–50 (1991) (“It is by now notorious that legal doctrines and judicial 
decisions in the area of religious freedom are in serious disarray.”); see also TUSHNET, supra note 
20, at 247 (“The constitutional law of religion is ‘in significant disarray.’” (quoting Stephen Pepper, 
The Conundrum of the Free Exercise Clause—Some Reflections on Recent Cases, 9 N. KY. L. REV. 
265, 303 (1982))). 
 23.  Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality, Separation and Accommodation: Tensions in American 
First Amendment Doctrine, in LAW AND RELIGION 63, 63 (Rex J. Ahdar ed., 2000). 
 24.  This characterization marks a rare point where Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager 
converge with Justice Clarence Thomas.  See Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 
S. Ct. 12, 13 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The 
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The critics are mistaken.  Neutrality is a valuable and useful idea.  It 
works well as a master concept in the theory of the Religion Clauses.  If the 
concept of neutrality is properly understood, it can resolve the deepest 
puzzles in contemporary religion jurisprudence.  The critics of neutrality are 
right that the concept is indefensible when it is understood at the highest 
possible level of abstraction.  Yet neutrality has a persistent appeal.  Even 
the most sophisticated critics of neutrality acknowledge that modern political 
life requires some degree of abstraction away from controversial conceptions 
of the good.  Almost no one regrets the state’s refusal to take a position on 
the metaphysical status of the Eucharist.  Neutrality’s continuing power 
demands explanation. 
The answer is that neutrality is available in many forms.  The First 
Amendment stands for one such specification.  That specification has done 
its work well. 
There is, indisputably, a deep coherence problem in First Amendment 
law.  The Court has interpreted the First Amendment to mean that “[n]either 
a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.  Neither can pass 
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over 
another.”27  But the Court has also acknowledged that “the Free Exercise 
Clause, . . . by its terms, gives special protection to the exercise of 
religion.”28  Accommodation of religion as such is permissible.  Quakers’ 
and Mennonites’ objections to participation in war have been accommodated 
since Colonial times.  Other such claims are legion.  Persons whose religions 
place special value on the ritual consumption of peyote or marijuana (or 
wine, during Prohibition) seek exemption from drug laws.  Landlords who 
have religious objections to renting to unmarried or homosexual couples 
want to be excused from antidiscrimination laws.29  Churches seeking to 
expand sometimes ask for exemptions from zoning or landmark laws.  The 
Catholic church wants to discriminate against women when ordaining 
priests.  Jewish and Muslim prisoners ask for Kosher or halal food.  These 
Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1245, 1246 (1994). 
 25.  Ronald Y. Mykkeltvedt, Souring on Lemon: The Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause 
Doctrine in Transition, 44 MERCER L. REV. 881, 883 (1993). 
 26.  Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Unthinking Religious Freedom, 74 TEX. L. 
REV. 577, 578 (1996).  Most of these quotations are drawn from PAUL HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC 
AGE: LAW, RELIGION, AND THE CONSTITUTION, at xii (2011). 
 27.  Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). 
 28.  Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981). 
 29.  For a discussion of this specific issue, see Andrew Koppelman, You Can’t Hurry Love: Why 
Antidiscrimination Protections for Gay People Should Have Religious Exemptions, 72 BROOK. L. 
REV. 125 (2006). 
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scruples have often been deferred to, and religious objectors have frequently 
been exempted from obligations that the law imposes on all others.   
 There is considerable dispute about whether the decision to 
accommodate ought to be one for legislatures or courts, but that debate rests 
on the assumption, common to both sides, that someone should make such 
accommodations.  The sentiment in favor of such accommodations is nearly 
unanimous in the United States.  When Congress enacted the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, which attempted to require states to grant such 
exemptions, the bill passed unanimously in the House and drew only three 
opposing votes in the Senate.30  After the Supreme Court struck down the 
Act as exceeding Congress’s powers, many states passed their own laws to 
the same effect.31 
Many of those opposed to judicially administered accommodations, 
such as Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, think that it is appropriate for 
such accommodations to be crafted by legislatures.32 
Each of these measures raises the same dilemma.  If government must 
be neutral toward religion, then how can this kind of special treatment be 
permissible?   
It is not logically possible for the government both to be neutral between 
religion and nonreligion and to give religion special protection.  Some 
Justices and many commentators have therefore regarded the First 
Amendment as in tension with itself.  Call this the free 
exercise/establishment dilemma. 
This apparent tension can be resolved.  Begin with an axiom: The 
Establishment Clause forbids the state from declaring religious truth.  A 
number of considerations support this requirement that the government keep 
its hands off religious doctrine.  One reason why it is forbidden is because 
the state is incompetent to determine the nature of this truth.  Another, a 
bitter lesson of the history that produced the Establishment Clause, is that 
the use of state power to resolve religious controversies is terribly divisive 
and does not really resolve anything.  State involvement in religious matters 
has tended to oppress religious minorities.  Finally, there is a consideration 
that is now frequently overlooked, but which powerfully influenced both the 
Framers and the Justices who shaped modern Establishment Clause doctrine: 
the idea that establishment tends to corrupt religion.  Official religious 
pronouncements tend to produce religion of a peculiarly degraded sort.  If 
 30.  Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 160 (1997). 
 31.  For a survey, see Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and 
Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 211–12 
& nn.368–73 (2004). 
 32.  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 544 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (“The 
issue presented by Smith is, quite simply, whether the people, through their elected representatives, 
or rather this Court, shall control the outcome of those concrete cases . . . .  The historical evidence 
put forward by the dissent does nothing to undermine the conclusion we reached in Smith: It shall be 
the people.”). 
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the state gets to discern God’s will, we will be told that God wants the re-
election of the incumbent administration. 
These considerations mandate a kind of neutrality.  The state may not 
favor one religion over another.  It also may not take a position on contested 
theological propositions. 
It is however possible, without declaring religious truth, for the state to 
favor religion at a very abstract level.33  Texas Monthly v. Bullock,34 for 
example, invalidated a law that granted a tax exemption to theistic 
publications, but not atheistic or agnostic publications.  Justice Brennan’s 
plurality opinion said that a targeted exemption would be appropriate for 
publications that “sought to promote reflection and discussion about 
questions of ultimate value and the contours of a good or meaningful life.”35  
Justice Blackmun thought it permissible for the state to favor human activity 
that is specially concerned with “such matters of conscience as life and 
death, good and evil, being and nonbeing, right and wrong.”36  What is 
impermissible is for the state to decide that one set of answers to these 
questions is the correct set. 
But the state can abstain from endorsing any specification of the best or 
truest religion while treating religion as such, understood very abstractly, as 
valuable.  That is what the state in fact does.  That is how it can 
accommodate religion as such while remaining religiously neutral.  The key 
to understanding the coherence of First Amendment religion doctrine is to 
grasp the specific, vaguely delimited level of abstraction at which “religion” 
is understood. 
What in fact unites such disparate worldviews as Christianity, 
Buddhism, and Hinduism is a well-established and well-understood 
semantic practice of using the term “religion” to signify them and relevantly 
analogous beliefs and practices.  Efforts to distill this practice into a 
definition have been unavailing.  But the common understanding of how to 
use the word has turned out to be sufficient.  Courts almost never have any 
difficulty in determining whether something is a religion or not. 
The list of reported cases that have had to define “religion” is 
remarkably short.37  The reference I rely on here, Words and Phrases, is one 
of the standard works of American legal research, a 132-volume set 
collecting brief annotations of cases from 1658 to the present.  Each case 
 33.  See Andrew Koppelman, Does Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1635, 
1677 (2005). 
 34.  489 U.S. 1, 1 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 35.  Id. at 16. 
 36.  Id. at 27–28 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 37.  Id. 
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discusses the contested definition of a word whose meaning determines 
rights, duties, obligations, and liabilities of the parties.  Some words have 
received an enormous amount of attention from the courts.  Two examples, 
abandonment and abuse of discretion, drawn at random from the first 
volume of this immense compilation, each exceed 100 pages.38  Religion, on 
the other hand, takes up less than five pages.39  The question of what 
“religion” means is theoretically intractable, but, as a practical matter, barely 
relevant.  We know it when we see it.  And when we see it, we treat it as 
something good. 
There is a limit to the state’s abstention from religious questions.  As I 
already noted, there is a well-established tradition of ceremonial deism—
such as “In God We Trust” on the currency.  Only recently has anyone on 
the Court articulated a principle that purports to distinguish permissible from 
impermissible deism.  Now the general rule seems to be that old forms of 
deism are grandfathered into constitutionality, but newer ones are 
unconstitutional.  Thus, the Court recently held that an official Ten 
Commandments display is unconstitutional if it was erected recently, but not 
if it has been around for decades.40  Justice O’Connor, concurring in a 
decision concerning the inclusion of the words “under God” in the Pledge of 
Allegiance, explicitly made the age of a ceremonial acknowledgement 
relevant to its constitutionality.41  She thought that constitutionality was 
supported by the absence of worship or prayer, the absence of reference to a 
particular religion, and minimal religious content.  But the first of her factors 
was “history and ubiquity.”42  “The constitutional value of ceremonial deism 
turns on a shared understanding of its legitimate nonreligious purposes,” 
Justice O’Connor wrote.  “That sort of understanding can exist only when a 
given practice has been in place for a significant portion of the Nation’s 
history, and when it is observed by enough persons that it can fairly be 
called ubiquitous.”43  The consequence is to make old and familiar forms of 
ceremonial deism constitutional, but to discourage innovation.   
This casual identification of God with the nation is hard to defend, and I 
am not eager to defend it.  On the other hand, it is clearly not going away, so 
we ought to consider what can be said in favor of drawing the line here. 
Two considerations are especially salient.  The first is that ceremonial 
deism represented a common ground strategy—an effort, in its own time, to 
understand “religion” in an ecumenical and nonsectarian way.  When these 
 38.  See Abandonment, in 1 WORDS AND PHRASES 37–147 (2007); Abuse of Discretion, id. at 
323–462 and, in the 2008 supplement, 8–25. 
 39.  See Religion, in 36C WORDS AND PHRASES 153–57 (2002). 
 40.  Compare McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (invalidating recently 
erected display), with Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (upholding forty-year-old display). 
 41.  Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 39–44 (2004) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
 42.  Id. at 37. 
 43.  Id. 
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elements of civil religion were put in place, the existence of God appeared to 
be the one aspect of religion that was to the various religious factions then 
dominant in American life.  The continuation of this old settlement is not an 
effort by an incumbent administration to manipulate religion or a 
triumphalist effort to exclude outsiders.  It simply perpetuates the 
background that is in place.  It recognizes that people are invested, in some 
cases very deeply, in the status quo.44 
The second is that new manifestations are not at all ecumenical.  Today, 
the invocation of theism, and specifically the erection of a Ten 
Commandments display, is an intervention in the bitterest religious 
controversies that now divide us.  Douglas Laycock thinks that a lesson of 
O’Connor’s opinion is that “separationist groups should sue immediately 
when they encounter any religious practice newly sponsored by the 
government.”45  That is precisely the right lesson for them to take.  New 
sponsorship of religious practices is far more likely to represent a 
contemporaneous effort to intervene in a live religious controversy than the 
perpetuation of old forms.46   
 An alternative proposed by some critics—of construing “traditional 
acknowledgement” broadly enough to include anything the state wants to 
do—would read the Establishment Clause out of the Constitution.  
Ceremonial deism has an effect on religion.  It produces a culture in which 
many people feel that their religious beliefs are somehow associated with 
patriotism.  This has the salutary effect of fostering civic unity and common 
moral ideals and tempering religious fanaticism.  It also has the less 
attractive effect of encouraging self-righteous nationalism and the idea that 
whatever the United States does, however repugnant, is somehow divinely 
sanctioned.47  However, neither of these effects is specifically aimed at by 
government when it perpetuates these rituals.  Political manipulation, in that 
sense, is not occurring. 
 44.  See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 
1228–29 (2003) (describing “status quo bias,” the tendency of persons “to prefer the present state of 
the world to alternative states, all other things being equal”). 
 45.  Laycock, supra note 31, at 232. 
 46.  As with the Ten Commandments, this can sometimes be true of the same text in different 
contexts.  For example, placing “In God We Trust” on all American currency was a manifestation of 
generic ecumenism and anticommunism in 1956, but when Indiana in 2006 placed the same words 
on its license plates, it was taking sides in the culture wars.  For a similar conclusion, see 
CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 147 (2007). 
 47.  See also Jeffrey James Poelvoorde, The American Civil Religion and the American 
Constitution, in HOW DOES THE CONSTITUTION PROTECT RELIGIOUS FREEDOM? 141 (Robert A. 
Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds., 1987).  For recent examples of the latter unattractive effect, see 
Andrew Koppelman, Reading Lolita at Guantanamo, 53 DISSENT 64 (2006). 
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 So contemporary Religion Clause analysis is layered.  An old abstract 
conception of religion, which in light of growing plurality is not nearly as 
abstract and uncontroversial as it used to be, is allowed to persist, but not to 
grow.  By grandfathering the old 1950s civil religion and saying that it could 
proceed as far as it has and no further, the Supreme Court has essentially 
declared it immune from further tinkering.  Ceremonial deism is secure, but 
it dwells in a walled city, safe but trapped.  The new civil religion, on the 
other hand, is the primary generator of the law of religion in the United 
States today. 
American neutrality’s vagueness has much to be said for it.  This is not 
an essay in comparative law, so I will merely note two regimes that have 
tried a different approach.  France’s insistence on a more uncompromising 
secularism has produced the notorious and apparently unending headscarf 
controversy, which has bitterly alienated not only Muslims, but also Jews 
and Sikhs.48  Italy’s attempt to evenhandedly fund all religions requires that 
each religion have some official leadership to receive and disburse the 
money.  Because Italian-Muslims are in fact diverse and fragmented, the 
government finds itself in the embarrassing predicament of either refusing 
recognition to Islam or recognizing the largest faction, which represents only 
a small minority and is associated with anti-Semitism and violence.49  By 
refusing official recognition of specific religions, either positive or negative, 
America has avoided these difficulties. 
III.  MISSING THE POSSIBILITIES 
My inquiry straddles two fields of study: law and political theory.  
When each of these disciplines addresses the law’s treatment of religion, it 
cannot do its work well unless it is informed by the other.  The difficulties 
that ensue from a failure to grasp the particularity of American practice are 
revealed in the work of two leading thinkers on opposite sides of the 
political spectrum: philosopher John Rawls and Justice Scalia.  Neither of 
them appreciates the unique kind of neutrality instantiated in American law. 
Rawls is the best-known exponent of a liberal theory that aims at 
neutrality toward all controversial conceptions of the good.  He claimed that 
the “intuitive idea” of his theory was “to generalize the principle of religious 
toleration to a social form . . . .”50 
 48.  See generally JOHN R. BOWEN, WHY THE FRENCH DON’T LIKE HEADSCARVES: ISLAM, THE 
STATE, AND PUBLIC SPACE (2008). 
 49.  See Andrew Koppelman, The New American Civil Religion: Lessons from Italy, 41 GEO. 
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 861, 872–74 (2010). 
 50.  See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 206 n.6/180 n.6 rev. (1971; revised ed., 1999) 
[hereinafter RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE]; see also id. at 220/193 rev..  Other exponents of liberal 
neutrality have described their project in similar terms.  See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, 
RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 99 (1984); GERALD F. GAUS, JUSTIFICATORY LIBERALISM: AN 
ESSAY ON EPISTEMOLOGY AND POLITICAL THEORY 170 (1996); CHARLES LARMORE, THE MORALS 
OF MODERNITY 144 (1996). 
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A well-ordered society, for Rawls, “is a society all of whose members 
accept, and know that the others accept, the same principles (the same 
conception) of justice.”51  The aim is a stable basis for mutually respectful 
political life in a society that is profoundly divided about the good life.  
Political liberalism is first and foremost a response to a problem: “[H]ow is 
it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and 
equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines?”52 
Rawls’s well-known answer is the original position and the decision 
procedure modeled in A Theory of Justice.  That procedure generates a 
conception of justice that is designed to exclude from the outset 
controversial conceptions of the good.  “Systems of ends are not ranked in 
value” in the original position, because the parties do not know their 
conceptions of the good.53  Those conceptions of the good simply do not 
figure into reasoning about the justice of the basic structure of society. 
Rawls evidently thinks that abstracting away from all controversial 
conceptions of the good life is the only reliable path to social unity.  In 
modern societies, there is so much normative pluralism that the only 
overlapping consensus that is consistent with respectful relations is that 
constructed without any reference to the actual normative views of members 
of society.  Political liberalism, he argues, should be freestanding, so that it 
“can be presented without saying, or knowing, or hazarding a conjecture 
about, what comprehensive doctrines it may belong to, or be supported 
by.”54  “[T]he political conception of justice is worked out first as a 
freestanding view that can be justified pro tanto without looking to, or trying 
to fit, or even knowing what are, the existing comprehensive doctrines.”55 
 Rawls aspires to “civic friendship,” in which we the citizens exercise 
power over one another on the basis of “reasons we might reasonably expect 
that they, as free and equal citizens, might reasonably also accept.”56  
Reasonable people understand that others will not accept their 
comprehensive views.  “Putting people’s comprehensive doctrines behind 
 51.  JOHN RAWLS, A Kantian Conception of Equality, in COLLECTED PAPERS 254, 255 (Samuel 
Freeman ed., 1999). 
 52.  JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 4 (expanded ed. 1996) [hereinafter RAWLS, 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM]. 
 53.  RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 50, at 19/17 rev. 
 54.  RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 52, at 12–13. 
 55.  John Rawls, Reply to Habermas, 42 J. PHIL. 132, 145 (1995). For similar formulations, see 
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 52, at xlvii; JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason 
Revisited, in COLLECTED PAPERS 585 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999) [hereinafter RAWLS, Public 
Reason Revisited]; JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 37, 188–89 (Erin Kelly 
ed., 2001). 
 56.  RAWLS, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 55, at 579. 
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the veil of ignorance enables us to find a political conception of justice that 
can be the focus of an overlapping consensus and thereby serve as a public 
basis of justification in a society marked by the fact of reasonable 
pluralism.”57  The path to actual civic friendship leads through reasonable 
terms of cooperation.58 
This approach may possibly work under certain circumstances, but they 
are likely to be as unusual as the circumstances in which it is safe to drive a 
car while blindfolded.  If you want civic friendship, you need to learn what 
your fellow citizens think before you propose terms of cooperation.  T.M. 
Scanlon explains why the strategy of surveying actual comprehensive views 
would not be satisfactory to Rawls.  “It would be impossible to survey all 
possible comprehensive views and inadequate, in an argument for stability, 
to consider just those that are represented in a given society at a given time 
since others may emerge at any time and gain adherents.”59  The history of 
American neutrality shows, however, that a consensus built around the 
convergence of a contingent set of actual views may last a long time.60 
Rawls is right that we should generalize from the practice of religious 
toleration.  But before we can do that, we must understand the practice of 
religious toleration.  A political philosophy informed by this history will be 
better able to think about how to achieve the aspiration that Rawls articulates 
so well. 
Justice Scalia is also concerned about the terms of cooperation in a 
pluralistic society.  He thinks that the answer is a generalized monotheism: 
“[N]othing, absolutely nothing, is so inclined to foster among religious 
believers of various faiths a toleration—no, an affection—for one another 
than voluntarily joining in prayer together, to the God whom they all 
worship and seek.”61  Such a broad monotheism is also a solution to the free 
exercise/establishment dilemma.  The way out of that dilemma is to relax the 
requirements of disestablishment: “[O]ur constitutional tradition . . . ruled 
out of order government-sponsored endorsement of religion . . . where the 
endorsement is sectarian, in the sense of specifying details upon which men 
and women who believe in a benevolent, omnipotent Creator and Ruler of 
the world are known to differ (for example, the divinity of Christ).”62 
 57.  JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 32 (1999). 
 58.  That the aim is to contain disagreement within a framework of mutual respect is particularly 
clear in T.M. Scanlon, The Difficulty of Tolerance, in TOLERATION: AN ELUSIVE VIRTUE 226–39 
(David Heyd ed., 1998), which is cited with approval in RAWLS, Public Reason Revisited, supra 
note 55, at 588 n.42. 
 59.  T.M. Scanlon, Rawls on Justification, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS 164 
(Samuel Freeman ed., 2003). 
 60.  This critique of Rawls is elaborated in Andrew Koppelman, The Limits of Constructivism: 
Can Rawls Condemn Female Genital Mutilation?, 71 REV. POL. 459, 460 (2009). 
 61.  Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 646 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 62.  Id. at 641. 
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This revision would free the Court’s reading of the Religion Clauses 
from self-contradiction.  But it does not work, because it discriminates 
among religions.  Scalia frankly acknowledges that ceremonial theism would 
entail “contradicting the beliefs of some people that there are many gods, or 
that God or the gods pay no attention to human affairs.”63  Yet he once 
wrote: “I have always believed, and all my opinions are consistent with the 
view, that the Establishment Clause prohibits the favoring of one religion 
over others.”64 
Not all religions believe in “a benevolent, omnipotent Creator and Ruler 
of the world.”65  The Court held long ago that the Establishment Clause 
forbids government to “aid those religions based on a belief in the existence 
of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs.”66  The 
membership of the latter has been steadily growing in the United States. 
Scalia is driven to this thin state-sponsored religious discrimination 
because he thinks that there is no other coherent answer to the free 
exercise/establishment dilemma, and no other way to foster civic unity.  His 
desire to bring coherence to this area of the law is admirable.  But he does 
not appreciate the fluidity of neutrality. 
The civic friendship to which Rawls aspires, the reconciliation of free 
exercise and establishment to which Scalia aspires, can be, indeed already is 
being, achieved, but on different terms than either of them imagines. 
IV.  IS AMERICAN NEUTRALITY GOOD? 
My analysis of modern Religion Clause doctrine only goes part of the 
way toward answering the critics.  I have thus far addressed the incoherence 
objection, but there remains the allegation of normative unattractiveness.  
Here there are two sets of objections from different directions.  One 
objection is that this conception is hostile to religion and opposed to its 
flourishing.  The other is that this conception is too friendly to religion, and 
that it is unfair for the state to give religion as such special treatment. 
Objections to American law’s singling out of religion come from two 
directions.  One view is that the law is too secular.  The state ought to be 
able to endorse religious ideas that many citizens share: there should be 
prayer in schools, official religious ceremonies, perhaps even more specific 
endorsement of, say, Christianity. 
 63.  McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 893 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 64.  Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 748 (1994) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). 
 65.  Lee, 505 U.S. at 641. 
 66.  Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961). 
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In order to address this claim, one must consider the substantive scope 
of the Establishment Clause.  That requires an examination of its purposes.  
A core impetus for disestablishment, I already noted, is the idea that religion 
is corrupted by state support, and flourishes without it.67  Those who are 
eager to live in a religion-friendly nation should reflect on the evidence that 
the regime they are attacking already gives them what they want. 
Most of the philosophical literature attacks the regime from a different 
direction: claiming that the separation of church and state in America is too 
weak, that the regime should not be treating religion as a good at all. (This 
may have something to do with the fact that academic philosophy 
departments are dominated by liberal secularists.)  This would rule out any 
significance for the corruption argument, which presumes religion as a value 
that needs protection from state interference. 
I have elsewhere addressed different versions of this claim: that there is 
nothing valuable about religion as such;68 that this value is appropriately re-
described as “conscience;”69 that the goodness of religion is too controversial 
to be an appropriate basis of political (much less judicial) decision in a 
diverse society (this is Rawls’s objection);70 that even if religion is good, it is 
unfair to privilege it over other, equally valuable human concerns.71  I cannot 
repeat those arguments here.  Instead I will explain why, as a general matter, 
it is reasonable for American law to treat religion as a good.  Then I will 
consider the appropriate role of religious influence on politics and law. 
The question is not whether religion, generically, is good.  That question 
is profoundly unanswerable.  In societies in which religious understanding 
and practice are implicated in most if not all of social life, such as ancient 
Sumerians or modern Brooklyn Hasidim, there is no secular world that 
stands apart from the transcendent cosmic order.72  For those who live in 
such a framework, life without religion is no more possible than life without 
carbon atoms.73  Their religion gives them a language and practices that 
make sense of their lives, but can also be a source of pain and confusion that 
makes difficult lives worse; these effects cannot be disentangled.74 
 67.  See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 68.  Andrew Koppelman, How Shall I Praise Thee?  Brian Leiter on Respect for Religion, 47 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 961 (2010) [hereinafter Koppelman, Praise Thee]. 
 69.  Andrew Koppelman, Conscience, Volitional Necessity, and Religious Exemptions, 15 LEGAL 
THEORY 215 (2009). 
 70.  See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 71.  See Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?, 2006 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 571. 
 72.  PETER L. BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY: ELEMENTS OF A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF 
RELIGION 112–21 (Anchor ed. 1969). 
   73.  See generally id. 
 74.  See, e.g., ROBERT A. ORSI, “Mildred, Is It Fun to Be a Cripple?”  The Culture of Suffering 
in Mid-Twentieth Century American Catholicism, in BETWEEN HEAVEN AND EARTH: THE 
RELIGIOUS WORLDS PEOPLE MAKE AND THE SCHOLARS WHO STUDY THEM 19 (2005). 
DO NOT DELETE 1/9/13  2:37 PM 
[Vol. 39: 1115, 2013] Religious Neutrality in American Law 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
 
1129
Our question is whether, in the United States, it is appropriate for the 
state to treat religion as if it is good.  The basis for doing so is in part the 
peculiar nature of the religion-based claims that find their way to the courts 
here. 
By the time any claim does that, it has passed through two filters that 
inevitably eliminate many religious forms.  The first is that the most toxic 
kinds of religion cannot exist on American soil: because they cannot obey 
the basic rules of criminal law, they must change or die.  The other (which is 
in part a consequence of the first) is that most manifestations of religion in 
the United States generate no legal or political claims. 
Some religious beliefs are obviously bad, both in themselves and 
specifically for a free society.  Early liberalism had to do a job on religion in 
order to make it into something that could exist in a liberal state.  For 
instance, the now neglected second half of Hobbes’s Leviathan tried to show 
that Christianity, properly understood, did not require religious wars and 
persecutions.75  Hobbes’s project has been a huge success.  The kind of 
destructive religion that he worried about is nearly extinct in the 
contemporary United States.76  Any religious group that tried, for example, 
to violently crush nonadherents  would itself quickly be crushed.77 
And then there is the second filter.  American law is concerned only 
with the goodness of that subset of religion that is protected from corruption 
by the Establishment Clause or is the basis of valid free exercise claims.  
Religions that demand state enforcement are not treated as good by the 
American regime.  Most religious activity violates no law and so receives no 
judicial attention, positive or negative.  The law must decide which (if any) 
state entanglements with religion ought to be avoided, and which (if any) 
religious claims the state should, can, or must accommodate.  With respect 
to establishment, our question is whether religion is likely to be better if it is 
not (or, if you prefer, worse if it is) linked to the power of the state.  With 
respect to free exercise, our question is whether the practice of 
accommodating religious claims is likely to make people’s lives better. 
   75.  THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 409-715 (C.B. MacPherson ed., 1968) (1651). 
 76.  When Eisenhower declared, “Our form of government has no sense unless it is founded in a 
deeply felt religious faith, and I don’t care what it is,” he less famously made clear in the next 
sentence that he was not talking about just any religion at all: “With us of course it is the Judeo-
Christian concept but it must be a religion that all men are created equal.”  Henry, supra note 2, at 
36, 38. 
 77.  Under the contemporary state and federal RFRAs, a religion demanding, say, the killing of 
nonadherents would be entitled to judicial scrutiny of the burden that the homicide laws place upon 
its exercise.  That burden would nominally be invalid unless necessary to a compelling interest.  To 
that extent, even this religion would be treated as presumptively valuable.  These laws so obviously 
survive such scrutiny that no one has bothered to test them.   
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So why should we think that religion (even thus filtered) deserves this 
kind of solicitude?  Why think that it plays a good role in people’s lives?  
There are two kinds of answers.  One assumes arguendo that the religious 
beliefs in question are mistaken and then asks whether they nonetheless have 
value.  The other makes no such assumption. 
The basic social function of religion, Peter Berger observed long ago, is 
one of a distinctive kind of legitimation.  It gives people’s lives and social 
roles an ultimate ontological status, giving them a cosmic, sacred frame of 
reference that can be the source of “an ultimate sense of rightness, both 
cognitively and normatively.”78   
This way of putting matters sounds conservative, but the point applies 
equally to the roles of social critic, reformer, and revolutionary.  One may 
object that this is epistemically culpable: there is no basis for any confidence 
that anything in the world ultimately is validated by a transcendent frame of 
reference.79  We just have to learn to live without any ultimate sense of 
rightness.  But this is also a kind of faith: there is no basis for confidence in 
the rejection of a transcendent frame of reference, either.  The old agnostic 
point, that a finite being cannot know an infinite one, cuts both ways.  How 
can you know that there is no transcendent frame?80  What epistemic warrant 
is there for that bold claim?  It is likewise possible to be a strong religious 
adherent while fully acknowledging one’s lack of epistemic certainty.81 
 What is really indispensable is hope.82  There is no epistemic warrant to 
assert with confidence that the religious person’s hope is groundless.  If this 
is true—and the arguments for agnosticism are familiar—then the insistence 
upon the contrary is itself a culpably false belief.  Hope, by definition, 
involves an absence of sufficient evidence.  It is not necessarily connected to 
acceptance of propositions. 
We know that religion is not indispensable to intelligibility: many 
individuals, and even a few national cultures, function perfectly well without 
it.83  But the ability to do without religion is a late and peculiar historical 
formation.  Modern humanism is itself shot through with quasi-religious 
 78.  BERGER, supra note 72, at 37. 
 79.  See Koppelman, Praise Thee, supra note 68, at 979–81. 
 80.  I have always been fond of the following two-line joke: 
Q.  Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you 
God? 
A.  If I knew the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, I would be God. 
 81.  See, e.g., JOSEPH CARDINAL RATZINGER, INTRODUCTION TO CHRISTIANITY 40–41 (J.R. 
Foster, trans., rev. ed. 2004). 
 82.  Paul Tillich’s description of God as one’s “ultimate concern,” which the Supreme Court 
quoted with approval in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 187 (1965), goes on to say that the 
deep concern of which he speaks should perhaps be called “hope, simply hope.”  PAUL TILLICH, THE 
SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS 59 (1948). 
 83.  See generally PHIL ZUCKERMAN, SOCIETY WITHOUT GOD: WHAT THE LEAST RELIGIOUS 
NATIONS CAN TELL US ABOUT CONTENTMENT (2008). 
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longings and even rituals.84  For many people, liberation from their religious 
beliefs would produce only anomie and despair.  The avoidance of such 
states is an appropriate object of positive appraisal.  So is the capacity to 
articulate at least some of the enormous range of élans and experiences that 
resist expression in secular discourse.85  For many people, hope takes a 
religious form, and it would be hard for them to imagine it in any other way. 
Many of the most progressive movements in American government, 
from abolitionism through the civil rights movement, have been grounded in 
religious considerations.  Today, religion is a powerful constraint on the 
tendencies toward economic and political inequality in contemporary 
America.86  Religious organizations tend to foster civic and political 
participation and skills, particularly among the less wealthy.87  Religious 
affiliation also correlates with voting rates.88  The effects are particularly 
striking among African-Americans, whose churches are more effective than 
white churches in educating and mobilizing members.89  American churches 
also provide social services that mitigate material inequalities, such as soup 
kitchens, homeless shelters, shelters for victims of domestic violence, 
medical and dental clinics, and hospitals.90  The experience of volunteering 
for such institutions may itself have a politicizing effect.91 
Surveys of religious individuals further documents the secular benefits 
of religion.  Religious people are more likely to do volunteer work; more 
likely to contribute their money to charity; more likely to be involved in 
their communities.92  They are also happier.93 
Thus far we have considered only the secular benefits of religion—
goods that are manifest even if one stipulates that there is no transcendent 
reality and that religion is bunk.  But what if it is not?  Openness to that 
possibility gives yet another reason for the state to treat religion as good.94  
 84.  See generally REGINA MARA SCHWARTZ, SACRAMENTAL POETICS AT THE DAWN OF 
SECULARISM: WHEN GOD LEFT THE WORLD (2008); CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE (2007). 
 85.  See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS ET AL., AN AWARENESS OF WHAT IS MISSING: FAITH AND 
REASON IN A POST-SECULAR AGE (Ciaran Cronin trans., 2010); STEVEN D. SMITH, THE 
DISENCHANTMENT OF SECULAR DISCOURSE (2010). 
   86.  PAUL J. WEITHMAN, RELIGION AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 37–66 (2002). 
   87.  Id. at 42–44. 
   88.  Id. at 41. 
   89.  Id. at 46. 
   90.  Id. at 49. 
 91.  Id. at 41–66. 
   92.  ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E. CAMPBELL, AMERICAN GRACE: HOW RELIGION DIVIDES 
AND UNITES US 443–89 (2010). 
 93.  Id. at 443–92. 
 94.  PAUL HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE: LAW, RELIGION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 83, 86 
(2011). 
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“Religion,” then, denotes a cluster of goods, including salvation (if you think 
you need to be saved), harmony with the transcendent origin of universal 
order (if it exists),95 responding to the fundamentally imperfect character of 
human life (if it is imperfect),96 courage in the face of the heartbreaking 
aspects of human existence (if that kind of encouragement helps),97 a 
transcendent underpinning for the resolution to act morally (if that kind of 
underpinning helps),98 contact with that which is awesome and indescribable 
(if awe is something you feel),99 and many others.  
But the goodness of religion does not entail that the state ought to try to 
resolve religious questions.  There is another approach, instantiated by the 
Court’s declaration in Engel v. Vitale100 that under the Establishment Clause, 
“religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its ‘unhallowed 
perversion’ by a civil magistrate.”101 
V.  WHAT KIND OF INFLUENCE? 
I will close by focusing on the topic of this conference, The Competing 
Claims of Law and Religion: Who Should Influence Whom?   
The question focuses on what seems to be an irresolvable tension 
between the right of religious citizens to participate in politics and the right 
of religious minorities to be free from religious domination.102  Believers 
claim that they will be disenfranchised if they are forbidden to seek to have 
laws enacted on the basis of their religious beliefs.  Religious minorities 
claim that laws with religious purposes exclude them from full citizenship.  
The reformulation of religious neutrality that I have developed here 
offers a way out of this impasse. 
Religious people have a full right to participate in democratic politics.  It 
is no accident that the vogue of theorizing, trying to show that it was 
immoral and disrespectful to make religious arguments about political 
matters, immediately followed the Presidential election of 1980, when the 
religious right first became a potent force in American politics.103  These 
 95.  JOHN M. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 89–90 (1980). 
 96.  See KEITH E. YANDELL, PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION 17–
34 (1999). 
 97.  See generally PAUL TILLICH, THE COURAGE TO BE (1952). 
 98.  See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., 
Cambridge University Press 1997) (1788); IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WITHIN THE LIMITS OF 
REASON ALONE (Theodore M. Green & Hoyt H. Hudson trans., Harper 1960) (1794). 
 99.  See RUDOLF OTTO, THE IDEA OF THE HOLY (John W. Harvey trans., 2d ed. 1950). 
 100.  370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
 101.  Id. at 431–32 (quoting JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST 
RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1785)). 
  102.  See Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 92–93 (2002) [hereinafter 
Koppelman, Secular Purpose]. 
 103.  Beginning in the 1980s, Americans became increasingly hostile to the involvement of 
religious leaders in politics, and this hostility was strongest among those who did not identify with 
any religion.  PUTNAM & CAMPBELL, supra note 92, at 120–21. 
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claims elicited a bitter response from religious thinkers, who argued that 
such a limitation on public discourse would deprive politics of important 
moral resources and deny them the right to state what they believe.  This 
response, which has made little impression on liberal theorists, gives rise to 
a puzzle: why did the liberals converge on and keep producing new 
articulations of a proposal, in the name of social unity and comity, that was 
so widely received as an insult?  How could so many brilliant people have 
been so rhetorically clumsy? 
Norms of civility may, paradoxically, be the reason.  It is impolite to 
challenge someone else’s religious beliefs.  Religion is private.  Even if you 
think your neighbor believes really stupid stuff, it’s not nice to say so.  He 
can go to his church.  You go to yours.  Don’t bother each other.   
This formula works only so long as neither of you offers a religious 
argument that is supposed to govern something that will affect both of you.  
Suppose, for example, that you propose that homosexual sex be criminalized 
because it’s an abomination before God.  How am I to respond?  If I 
disagree, my obvious answer is to say that your religious beliefs are wrong.  
By hypothesis, that is what I really think.  But it’s not nice to say that.  So I 
have to twist around to find some way to say that your views ought not to 
govern political decisions, without having to say that they’re false. 
 This strategy has been a disaster.  A doctrine that purports to be 
grounded in universal respect has left a lot of actual citizens feeling 
profoundly insulted.  This suggests that the social norm should be revisited.  
As soon as A invokes religious reasons for his political position, then it must 
be OK for B to challenge those reasons.  It may be acrimonious, but at least 
we’ll be talking about what really divides us (and we’ll avoid the strange 
theoretical pathologies that have plagued modern liberal theory, though 
these are mainly confined to the academy).  It’s more respectful to just tell 
each other what we think and talk about it.  
Open discussion also takes religious claims seriously, which American 
liberals urgently need to do.  Alienation from religion has been a disaster for 
the American left.  In the United States, progressive change—the enactment 
of the Establishment Clause, the abolition of slavery, the New Deal, and the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964—has been achieved only by an alliance of the 
secular and the religious.  Those on the left who rail against religion are 
playing into the hands of their enemies. 
So what are the limits of religious influence over politics in American 
constitutional law?104   
Recall that a major purpose of the Establishment Clause is to prevent the 
corruption of religion by government manipulation.  This means, at a 
  104.  The argument that follows is elaborated in Koppelman, Secular Purpose, supra note 102. 
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minimum, that the state is forbidden from declaring religious truth.  The 
classic formulation is that of Epperson v. Arkansas: “Government in our 
democracy, state and national, must be neutral in matters of religious theory, 
doctrine, and practice.”105  So the First Amendment’s prohibition of 
“establishment of religion” is, among other things, a restriction on 
government speech.  It means that the state may not declare articles of faith. 
The state may not express an opinion about religious matters.  It may not 
encourage citizens to hold certain religious beliefs. 
The axiom that government may not declare religious truth entails 
restrictions on government conduct.  It is a familiar point in free speech law 
that conduct which is not itself speech may nonetheless communicate a 
message and so be appropriately treated as speech.106  This means that the 
Establishment Clause’s restriction on government speech is also a restriction 
on symbolic conduct.  If government cannot declare religious truth, then it 
cannot engage in conduct the meaning of which is a declaration of religious 
truth.  It would be illegitimate, for instance, for a state to erect a crucifix in 
front of the state capitol.  It would also be illegitimate for the state to carve, 
over the entrance of the capitol, an inscription reading “JESUS IS LORD” or 
“THE POPE IS THE ANTICHRIST.”  The state simply is not permitted to 
take an official position on matters of religion. 
Government, however, does more than just erect symbols.  The most 
obvious way in which the government expresses an opinion is through the 
passage of legislation.  In this arena, the government has available to it a 
particularly powerful type of symbolic conduct that is unavailable to other 
actors.  Through legislation, the government can, and often does, express a 
point of view. 
Suppose a statute is passed that makes it a crime for anyone to break the 
commandment to obey the Sabbath, as that commandment is understood by 
Orthodox Jews.  That is, the law makes it a felony to operate machinery on 
the Sabbath, to drive a car, to turn on an electric appliance, or to make a 
telephone call, and the law applies to private as well as public conduct, so 
that one can violate it by turning on the television while one is alone at 
home.107  There is no substantive constitutional right to do any of these 
things.  The problem with this law lies in its message . . . . It asserts as 
plainly as if it declared in so many words the correctness of the 
commandment to keep the Sabbath holy and of the Orthodox rabbis’ 
interpretation of that sentence.  It declares religious truth.  Thus, the secular 
purpose requirement works as a corollary to the axiom with which I began.  
If government cannot declare religious truth, then it cannot use its coercive 
powers to enforce religious truth. 
  105.  Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1968). 
  106.  See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (holding that the First Amendment 
protects the burning of a United States flag). 
  107.  On these prohibitions in Jewish law, see 14 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAI CA 567 (1971). 
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Steven D. Smith objects that “virtually every action taken by 
government at least tacitly teaches, if not the truth, then the falsity of some 
religious beliefs.”108  Thus, for example, teaching Darwin in the public 
schools implicitly contradicts the views of biblical literalists and six-day 
creationists.  Laws against murder contradict the religious beliefs of the 
Aztecs. A stop sign on a corner implicitly declares that it is not contrary to 
God’s will for the state to erect stop signs. 
To see why Smith’s objection is not fatal, consider Robert Audi’s 
observation that the justification for some laws “evidentially depend[s] on 
the existence of God (or on denying it) or on theological considerations, or 
on the pronouncements of a person or institution qua religious authority.”109  
Not all laws depend on theological considerations in this way.  The law 
mandating the stop sign has no such evidential dependence.  Nor the 
homicide law.  Nor the inclusion of Darwin in the curriculum. 
The ban on government declaring religious truth would, however, be 
violated if a science teacher were to say, at the end of the lesson, that 
“Darwin proves that God doesn’t exist.”  The question of how Darwin is to 
be integrated into a religious view is not one that the schools are authorized 
to address.  
There are, of course, nice questions on the margin.  Laws prohibiting the 
teaching of evolution, or requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in 
every classroom in a state, are so obviously theologically-loaded that the 
Court rightly judges that they go too far.110  But in the evolution case, unless 
the science teacher starts denying God’s existence, the state is taking no 
particular religious line.  A very wide range of religious views are consistent 
with Darwin’s theory. 
Of course, government should give reasons for what it does, but it can 
easily do that without embedding its actions in any particular religious 
narrative.  It is easy to defend the law against murder without saying 
anything at all about Aztec theology.  Perhaps some religious orthodoxy is in 
some sense implicit in the stop sign at an intersection; at a minimum, it 
excludes the proposition that God wants you to speed through the 
intersection without slowing down.  But there are many different theologies 
that can and do coincide in rejecting this proposition.  People with radically 
  108.  Steven D. Smith, Barnette’s Big Blunder, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 657 (2003); see also 
SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 13, at 81–90.  My response to Smith is elaborated in 
Andrew Koppelman, No Expressly Religious Orthodoxy: A Response to Steven D. Smith, 78 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 729 (2003) [hereinafter Koppelman, No Expressly Religious Orthodoxy]. 
 109.  ROBERT AUDI, RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND SECULAR REASON 89 (2000). 
  110.  See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42–43 (1980) (per curiam) (invalidating state law 
requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in every classroom in Kentucky); Epperson, 393 
U.S. at 109  (invalidating anti-evolution statute). 
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differing theological views can have adequate reasons for obeying both laws.  
The question is whether any given law is capable of justification without 
directly relying on theological considerations or religious authority.111  The 
statute authorizing the stop sign is an example of such a law.112 
Because [religious neutrality] focuses on what government is saying 
rather than on who supported any particular law, the participation of the 
religious is unimpaired.  The courts should monitor legislative output, not 
inputs.  Citizens may make whatever religious arguments they like in favor 
of a law, so long as the law that is ultimately passed is justifiable in 
nonreligious terms.  Because government may not take a position on 
religious truth, a law that can only be justified in religious terms is invalid.  
This means that courts have to assess the plausibility of whatever secular 
purposes are proffered by the state.  Thus, for example, in cases involving 
mandated teaching of “creation science” or “intelligent design,” the issue is 
whether the articulated secular purpose makes sense on its own terms.  The 
only federal court that has squarely confronted that question found that 
“intelligent design” was not a plausible scientific theory, and was therefore a 
religious view in disguise.113 
The requirement that a law have a secular purpose will, of course, 
prevent some people from getting what they want in the political process, 
but any meaningful constitutional restriction will do that.  This objection 
quarrels with constitutionalism in general, not with any particular version of 
it.  Under even a modest view of the Establishment Clause, a petition to make 
Anglicanism the established church of the United States, or to make 
felonious the celebration of the Catholic Mass, will not be addressable by the 
legislature.  This prohibition may restrict the ability of some citizens to get 
what they want in the political process. 
  111.  See Koppelman, Secular Purpose, supra note 102, at 88. 
 112.  Christopher Eberle has objected, in conversation, that this understanding of the 
Establishment Clause puts great weight on a distinction between morally equivalent actions.  Laws 
such as the Sabbath statute are unconstitutional because they communicate religious messages, even 
though the government has not made any explicit religious statement at all.  But teaching evolution 
is permissible even though it logically implies the falsity of certain specific religious beliefs—beliefs 
that are salient for many citizens.  In both cases, everyone understands that a religious message is 
being communicated.   
  Eberle’s concern must bypass the stop sign case, in which a religious view is implicit but not 
salient.  That would distend the secular purpose requirement to the point of absurdity, because there 
would be no way to engage in any intentional action without violating it.  Rather, the claim is that, if 
the principles extend to the Sabbath law, it should (must logically?) also extend to the science 
curriculum, forbidding any state action that is understood by some subset (how small?) of citizens to 
imply a religious message—even if that message is unlikely to have been salient to anyone else.  
This is, of course, an optional expansion of the requirement, but it could destroy the capacity of the 
state to pursue legitimate and perhaps urgent secular purposes.  It is not incoherent to make the 
secular purpose requirement easier to satisfy than this, so that a law will not be invalidated unless the 
case for it manifestly satisfies Audi’s condition.  This is what contemporary American law does, 
quite robustly and intelligibly.  The problem is not purely one of moral philosophy.  It is how to 
implement the Establishment Clause with workable rules of law. 
 113.  Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Sebastian Castellio, one of the earliest proponents of religious toleration, 
in 1554 declared it senseless to penalize “those who differ from the mighty 
about matters hitherto unknown, for so many centuries disputed, and not yet 
cleared up.”114  The state is as incompetent to decide religious questions 
today as it was then. 
The American regime of religious neutrality refuses to adjudicate those 
theological disputes.  This very refusal, targeted at religious questions, 
implicitly recognizes the value of religion.  The state reveals its reverence 
for the Absolute by omitting all reference to it in public decisionmaking. 
American religious neutrality demands that the state be silent about 
religious truth, but the silence is eloquent and highlights the importance of 
what is not articulated.  It is like a rest in music. 
 
 114.  SEBASTIAN CASTELLIO, CONCERNING HERETICS: WHETHER THEY ARE TO BE PERSECUTED 
AND HOW THEY ARE TO BE TREATED 123 (Roland H. Bainton et al. trans., 1935) (1554). 
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